Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science

Front Matter

2022-03-30

Daniel Halverson

Review of Deep Time Reckoning: How Future Thinking Can Help Earth Now

2022-03-11

Lissette Lorenz

The Two Virtues of Science

2022-03-03

Stephen John

During the COVID-19 pandemic, there was disagreement over whether the science supported facemask mandates. This paper interrogates debates over this question, paying particular attention to an ambiguity between two scientific virtues: epistemic caution and epistemic responsiveness. I suggest that there is an argument from each virtue to reasons to trust scientists’ claims in policy debate. However, as the case of facemask debates illustrates, it is not clear that scientists can possess both virtues simultaneously: the two virtues are in tension. After showing how this general framework can help us better understand debate, I turn to consider some possible ways of resolving this tension, arguing that none of them is entirely satisfactory.

Mistrust in Numbers

2022-03-03

Gil Eyal

This paper characterizes the crisis of expertise, especially as it manifested during the covid-19 pandemic, as a crisis of trust in regulatory science. The temporal structure of the facts produced by regulatory science differs from Kuhnian “normal science,” while they also contain profound distributional implications. As a result, they suffer from a set of congenital problems that provoke mistrust in a way that normal science facts do not. While “expertise” is often offered as an answer to these problems, the paper shows that it is a symptom of the malaise, reflecting a situation where it is no longer clear how to decide between competing claims to authority as experts. The current mistrust in experts and regulatory science during the pandemic, therefore, is part of a longer and systemic crisis of expertise provoked and sustained by multiple factors. The paper then offers an unsystematic set of rules of method to observe when addressing the thorny issues involving trust and mistrust: 1) trust is not a subjective attitude that can be measured by a survey; 2) mistrust is not the opposite of trust; 3) trust is a social skill involving a set of ethnomethods for distinguishing between responsible and “blind” trust; 4) attention to temporal framing is key to these methods; 5) disruption of this temporal framing – as routinely happens with regulatory facts, and especially during the pandemic – destroys trust.

Review of Strange Trips: Science, Culture, and the Regulation of Drugs

2022-03-03

Sergio Sismondo

Review of Environmental Expertise. Connecting Science, Policy, and Society

2022-03-03

Elodie Charrière

How (not) to Build an Expert

2022-03-03

Robert Naylor

The social contributors to the formation of expertise are often a taboo subject when practitioner communities interact with outsiders, making the exploration of these inputs a difficult endeavour. When exploring scientific communities, one resource that many STS and HSTM scholars can draw from is their personal experience as students of science – experts in waiting. I will draw on my personal experience as a physics student at a Russel Group university from 2014 to 2018, with a year abroad at a US institution. The UK physics course instilled in me an image of physics expertise that is hyper-specialised, apolitical, and ‘pure’. This was achieved through the choice of curriculum, the content of internal displays, and the culture of the department as mediated by informal interactions. This vision of expertise resonates with corporate entities whose interests are in experts that can function as stable commodities, rather than volatile political actors.

Reinventing Expertise in the History of Psychiatry and Eugenics

2022-03-03

Erika Dyck

This reflection piece considers how expertise has been generated within the history of madness, disability, eugenics, psychiatry and anti-psychiatry. As numerous scholars and critics have pointed out, the power of rational argumentation can be persuasive, while its absence can be pathologized. Yet, in the fields of madness studies and critical disability studies we can see many examples of how the dividing line between normal and pathological states have been contested, especially where those categories correspond with notions of expertise, experience, and insight. This short paper reflects on these themes and draws from a selection of research case studies, in the hopes of encouraging other scholars to take up these questions in their own work to destabilize concepts of expertise as fixed categories of ability and skill. Instead, I use these examples to promote a more complex and diverse way of interpreting expressions of dissent as potential forms of expertise.